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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-THE FEE SYSTEM OF
JUSTICE COURT JUDGES: VIOLATIVE OF FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS?--Brown v. Vance,
No. 72J-91(N) (S.D. Miss. 1978).
INTRODUCTION
In 1972 three plaintiffs in separate suits challenged the constitu-
tionality of Mississippi's justice of the peace' and mayor's court
systems. The federal district court suits were subsequently con-
solidated in Brown v. Vance2 and emerged as a broad attack on both
the criminal and civil jurisdiction of the justice of the peace courts
and on the use of the fee system of compensation for presiding judges.
A major thrust of the plaintiff's attack became moot following the
1976 U.S. Supreme Court decision in North v. Russell.' The Court
held that trials before lay judges which were appealable with a de
novo trial violated neither the due process nor equal protection
guarantees of the Constitution." The remaining challenge to the court
systems to be determined thus became the use of the fee system' to
compensate judges.
The plaintiffs conceded that justice of the peace fee statutes were
constitutional on their face since the judge received a fee irrespective
of whether he acquits or convicts. However, they argued that the ef-
fects of the court system in operation were unconstitutional.6
The plaintiffs contended that judges are dependent for their liveli-
hoods on the fees derived from civil and criminal litigation before
their courts. On the civil side creditors seeking adjudication of civil
collection suits may choose more than one justice court judge in the
'Prior to 1975 the presiding officers of the lower county court system were known as
justices of the peace; however, the designation for the office was changed in that year by
constitutional amendment to justice court judges. MIss. CONs'r. art. 6, § 171 (1890,
amended 1975).
'No. 72J-91(N) (S.D. Miss. 1976), appeal docketed, No. 78-3225 (5th Cir. Oct. II,
1978).
'427 U.S. 328 (1976).
'Id. at 339.
'When this case was heard, justice court judges received a uniform fee of six dollars
in all criminal cases docketed and affidavits signed. This fee was due whether convic-
tion or other disposition resulted. A uniform fee of eight dollars was provided in all civil
cases. This fee was payable by the losing party whether the case was contested or not
Also provided was an additional eight dollar fee for proceedings involving levy of execu-
tions on judgments, attachments, and garnishment proceedings. MIss. CODE ANN.
§ 25-7-25(a), (b), (g) (Supp. 1975) (current version at Supp. 1978). Fees are awarded as
costs and are adjudged against the party whom judgment is rendered against. Miss.
CODE ANN. § 11-9-127 (1972).
'No. 72J-91(N) (S.D. Miss. 1978), appeal docketed, No. 78-3225 (5th Cir. Oct. 11,
1978) (citing Melikian v. Avent, 300 F. Supp. 516 (N.D. Miss. 1969)).
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county when filing.' The plaintiffs argued that judges are aware that
creditors will take their suits elsewhere for collection if they obtain
unsatisfactory results from a particular court. Therefore, the plain-
tiffs argued that the judges are more likely to rule in favor of creditors
in order to continue securing collection suits and thus derive their
fees.' Likewise on the criminal side, the plaintiffs argued that judges
are more likely to be conviction oriented. In the two Mississippi
counties where judges have concurrent jurisdictions' it is possible for
law enforcement officers to prefer one judge over another when mak-
ing affidavits returnable. The judges are aware of this preference
power and the potential loss of fees resulting from adverse decisions
and thus render decisions favorable to the officers in order to continue
to obtain their "business." In the remaining Mississippi counties
where there is only one judge per district, the potential exists for law
enforcement officers to make arrest tickets returnable to the wrong
judge and set up roadblocks in the district of "'friendly" judges in
order to obtain convictions. Thus, the plaintiffs argued, in operation
the fee system works to give justice court judges an unconstitutional
pecuniary interest in the outcome of both civil and criminal cases
coming before their courts.'"
The district court rejected the plaintiffs' contentions finding that
they had failed to meet the burden of proof to support their
arguments. In criminal matters the district judge said there could be
no forum shopping in the eighty single-judge district counties if law
enforcement officers and judges follow the applicable law since
jurisdiction is proper in criminal cases only in the district where the
violation occurred." Although the plaintiffs had introduced into
evidence "a relatively small number" of arrest tickets returnable to
the wrong justice court judge, the court found the defendant's
'MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-9-101 (1972), which provides that the jurisdiction of a justice
court judge shall be co-extensive with his county, and venue is proper in either the
district where the debt is incurred, where the defendant resides, or where the property is
located.
'No. 72J-91(N) slip op. at 7 (S.D. Miss. 1978), appeal docketed, No. 78-3225 (5th
Cir. Oct. I1, 1978).
'Hinds and DeSoto Counties have two judges in each of the five districts within the
counties with both judges having concurrent jurisdiction over crimes which take place
within their district. MIss. CODE ANN. § 9-11-1 (Supp. 1975) (current version at Supp.
1978). An arresting officer has discretion in deciding which judge the accused will ap-
pear before. The officer may take the defendant before a judge other than the one in
whose district the violation occurred.
"No. 72J-91(N) slip op. at 9 (S.D. Miss. 1978), appeal docketed, No. 78-3225 (5th
Cir. Oct. I1, 1978).
"Id. at 8.
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evidence stronger on this point.' "[The facts show that law enforce-
ment officers, and particularly the Mississippi Highway Patrol, have
been instructed to charge the alleged violator 'within the district...
where the violation occurred and no place else' . . . and that
disciplinary measures would be instituted against any patrolman who
violated that directive.""
The court found that the location of highway patrol speed-traps
was based on reasonable considerations such as traffic counts and
types and classifications of roads instead of the availability of a "con-
victing" judge."
Concerning civil cases the court found that although forum shop-
ping by creditors may create a disparity between the fees of the
various justice court judges in a county, the practice does not violate a
defendant's constitutional rights. The district judge said that on
numerous occasions justice court judges have found in favor of the
defendants or entered judgments for less than that sued for by
creditor-plaintiffs and the creditors continue to file suits in their
courts." The federal judge also said that creditors testified that other
factors, such as efficiency and judicial experience, are elements con-
sidered by them when determining where to file their actions.'6
In weighing the evidence the court strongly relied on Withrow v.
Larkin"' which stated that plaintiffs "must overcome a presumption
of honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators."'" Consider-
ing this presumption and the evidence, the judge decided that the
plaintiffs had failed to meet the burden of proving the fee system
operated to deny constitutional rights.' 9
'Id. at 9. The court accepted the defendants' arguments finding that the plaintiffs
introduced no evidence to show whether the judge was available in the district where
the violation occurred, whether or not the violation continued across district lines,
whether the locations appearing on the face of the tickets were general or local, whether
the charge was contested, and whether the judge received the tickets and if he did





"421 U.S. 35 (1975). See also, Hortonville Joint School Dist. No. I v. Hortonville
Educ. Ass'n., 426 U.S. 482, 493, (1976); Central Ark. Auction Sale, Inc. v. Bergland,
520 F.2d 730 (1978); Giles Lowery Stockyards, Inc. v. Department of Agriculture, 565
F.2d 321, 324 (1977); Marathon Oil Co. v. EPA, 564 F.2d 1253, 1265 (1977); Gross v.
United States, 531 F.2d 482, 490 (1976); Klinge v. Lutheran Charities Ass'n. of St.
Louis, 523 F.2d 56, 63 (1975); Euster v. Pennsylvania State Horse Racing Comm'n.,
431 F. Supp. 828, 833 (E.D. Penn. 1977); Kelly v. Action for Boston Community
Development, 419 F. Supp. 511, 523 (D. Mass. 1976); Rite Aid Corp. v. Board of Phar-
macy, 421 F. Supp. 1161, 1176-77 (D. N.J. 1976); Stebbins v. Weaver, 396 F. Supp.
104, 114 (S.D. Wisc. 1975).
18421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975).
"No. 72J-91(N), slip op. at 32 (S.D. Miss. 1978), appeal docketed, No. 78-3225 (5th
Cir. Oct. 11, 1978).
1979]
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THE COURTS, FEE SYSTEMS, AND DUE PROCESS
The right to an impartial tribunal is guaranteed by the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion. 0 This right applies equally to criminal and civil litigation.
2'
Historically, courts at various levels have considered the constitu-
tional issue of whether a defendant's due process of law is violated
when he is tried by a judicial officer2 2 who has a pecuniary interest in
fees payable by the litigants. Due process requires that a judicial of-
ficer who receives fees from the litigants be disqualified. 2 However,
the degree of interest necessary to disqualify a judicial officer under a
fee system has yet to be clearly defined by the United States Supreme
Court.
A fee system was first held invalid by the Court in Tumey v.
Ohio.24 The Court held that a convicted defendant was denied due
process if the receipt of a fee by the mayor was predicated upon a con-
viction." The Court stated that, "Every procedure which would offer
a possible temptation to the average man as a judge to forget the
burden of proof required to convict the defendant, . . . denies the
[defendant] due process of law."1 6 In Tumey the Court also set forth
language sufficient to meet the standards of the maxim de minimis
non curat lex." This precept supports the view that a judicial officer
may receive fees in a trivial amount and not be disqualified from
hearing the case. In no case, however, has the court found any fee so
negligible as to be appropriately disregarded. Expanding this
restraint, one state court has held that any pecuniary interest that a
judicial officer has in a case, however remote, will disqualify him.
2 8
In Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 2 the United States Supreme
Court applied the possible temptation doctrine of Tumey to the case
of a mayor acting as a judicial officer. The mayor had wide executive
"See Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254 (1970); Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18
(1967); Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11 (1954).
"See Johnson v. Mississippi, 403 U.S. 212, 216 (1971); Fay v. New York. 332 U.S.
261, 268 (1946).
"In the interest of brevity "judicial officer" is used to represent judge, justice of the
peace, police court justice, or similar judicial officer.
"See Connally v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 245 (1977); Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409
U.S. 57 (1972); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927); Bennett v. Cottingham, 290 F.
Supp. 759 (N.D. Ala. 1968), affd 393 U.S. 317 (1969). See also Gibson v. Berryhill, 411
U.S. 564 (1973).
"-273 U.S. 510 (1927).
"ld. at 522.
"Id. at 532.
"Id. at 531 ("The law does not concern itself with trifles.").
"See, e.g., West Virginia ex rel. Reese v. Gies, 156 W.Va. 729, 198 S.E.2d 211
(1973); West Virginia ex rel. Moats v. Janco, 154 W.Va. 887, 180 S.E.2d 74 (1971);
West Virginia ex rel. Osborne v. Chinn, 146 W.Va. 610, 121 S.E.2d 610 (1961).
"1409 U.S. 57 (1972).
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powers and was responsible for his village's finances. A major portion
of the village's income was derived from the fines imposed by the
mayor in the mayor's court. The Court held this combination of ex-
ecutive responsibility for village finances and judicial functions was a
violation of the fourteenth amendment's due process guarantee of a
trial before a disinterested and impartial judicial officer."
Ward also considered the issue of whether the right to appeal and
to a trial de novo guaranteed a defendant due process even though the
judicial officer had a pecuniary interest at the outset. Some courts had
earlier held that the right to appeal and to a trial de novo secured due
process." But in Ward the Supreme Court rejected this reasoning,
stating that an accused is entitled to a "neutral and detached judge in
the first instance. "32
A few courts have held that even though a trial is before a justice
of the peace compensated on a fee basis, due process of law require-
ments are fulfilled by the right to a jury trial.3 In Melikian v. Avent"
the plaintiffs attacked the constitutionality of the justice of the peace
courts in Mississippi contending that the fee system induced justices to
favor creditors so they would continue patronizing the justice court.
This was particularly so, the plaintiffs asserted, since venue could
have been in more than one court. The federal court hearing Melikian
found no authority to support the plaintiff's assertion, nor was it im-
pressed by the merits of the argument. The court held that due process
was assured by the right to a jury trial with a six member jury.5
The presence of due process safeguards, or the lack thereof, in
compensation systems wherein judicial officers are paid only upon the
conviction of an accused in criminal cases has been considered by
many courts. Generally, the courts hold that the judicial officer has
an unconstitutional pecuniary interest in the outcome and is dis-
qualified from hearing the case.3 Other courts, however, have held
"AId. at 59-60.
"3See, e.g., Application of Borchert, 57 Wash. 2d 719, 359 P.2d 789 (1961); Ex parte
Steele, 220 N.C. 685, 18 S.E.2d 132 (1942), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 686 (1942); Brooks v.
Town of Potomac, 149 Va. 427, 141 S.E. 249 (1928). In Mississippi a defendant has a
right to appeal and to a trial de novo in circuit court, Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 11-51-85, 91
(1972). In counties with a county court, appeals are heard de novo in county court,
MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 11-51-81, 91 (1972).
11409 U.S. at 62.
"Melikian v. Avent, 300 F. Supp. 516 (N.D. Miss. 1969); People v. Cheever, 370
Mich. 165, 121 N.W.2d 430 (1963). See also State v. Davis, 16 Ohio Misc. 282, 241
N.E.2d 750 (1968).
11300 F. Supp. 516 (N.D. Miss. 1969).
"Id. at 518-19.
3'See, e.g., Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927); Bennett v. Cottingham, 290 F.
Supp. 759 (N.D. Ala. 1968), affd 393 U.S. 317 (1969); Hulett v. Julian, 250 F. Supp.
208 (M.D. Ala. 1966); Keith v. Gerber, 156 W. Va. 787, 197 S.E.2d 310 (1973); Doty v.
Goodwin 246 Ark. 149, 437 S.W.2d 233 (1969); Conkling v. De Lany, 167 Neb. 4, 91
N.W.2d 250 (1958); Roberts v. Noel, 296 S.W.2d 745 (Ky. 1956); Rolo v. Wiggins, 149
Fla. 264, 5 So. 2d 458 (1942).
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that the pecuniary interest of a judicial officer in statutory costs does
not disqualify him.3 7 The United States Supreme Court recently held a
Georgia statute involving issuance of a search warrant 8 by an in-
terested judicial officer violative of the fourth and fourteenth amend-
ments.3 ' An unsalaried justice of the peace received a fee if the war-
rant was issued but not if it was denied. The Court held that the defen-
dant was not subjected to a neutral and detached magistrate, but one
with a substantial pecuniary interest in the outcome."0
Under another system of compensation judicial officers are paid
from a fund obtained from proceeds of their court. Proceeds include
fees paid by litigants, fines, and forfeitures. Courts have reached dif-
ferent results when reviewing these systems. Some courts have held
that the judicial officer is disqualified as the system creates an un-
constitutional pecuniary interest."' Differing with this view, other
courts have held such a pecuniary interest to be too remote to dis-
qualify the judicial officer.4 2 A system whereby justices of the peace
are paid monies produced from tax levies has also been upheld.'
3
In civil cases, several systems of compensation have been held to
produce sufficient pecuniary interest to disqualify a judicial officer.
Fees payable to a justice of the peace only if he could secure costs
from debtors has been held sufficient to disqualify the justice.
4
1
Likewise, the West Virginia Supreme Court held that an increase in
fees payable upon execution on the judgment would also suffice to dis-
qualify an officer.4' The court followed its previously announced dic-
tate in State ex rel. Osborne v. Chinn."6 In.Osborne the West Virginia
Supreme Court held that a justice of the peace is disqualified when he
has a pecuniary interest in a case tried by him, however remote.' 7 The
same court has also declared unconstitutional a system of paying the
justice of the peace for each civil suit entered and tried.' 8 A West
Virginia statute'" provided that a justice of the peace would receive a
"See, e.g., Ex parte Steele, 220 N.C. 685, 18 S.E.2d 132 (1942), cert. denied, 316
U.S. 686 (1942); Crosby v. State, 49 Ga. App. 210, 174 S.E. 721 (1934); Moulton v.
Byrd, 224 Ala. 403, 140 So. 384 (1932).
'GA. CODE ANN. § 24-1601 (1971).
3'Connally v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 245 (1977).
'°id. at 250-51.
"See, e.g., West Virginia ex rel. Osborne v. Chinn, 146 W. Va. 610, 121 S.E.2d 610
(1961); Williams v. Brannen, 116 W. Va. 1, 178 S.E. 67 (1935).
"See, e.g., Moulton v. Byrd, 224 Ala. 403, 140 So. 384 (1932); Ex parte Guerrero,
69 Cal. 88, 10 P. 261 (1886).
'West Virginia ex rel. Moats v. Janco, 154 W. Va. 887, 180 S.E.2d 74, 81 (1971).
"Limerick v. Murlatt, 43 Kan. 318, 23 P. 567 (1890).
"West Virginia ex tel. Reece v. Gies, 156 W. Va. 729, 198 S.E.2d 211 (1973).
'0146 W. Va. 610, 121 S.E.2d 610 (1961).
"Id. at 612, 121 S.E.2d at 612.
"West Virginia ex tel. Shrewsbury v. Poteet, 202 S.E.2d 628 (W. Va. 1974).
49W VA. CODE § 50-17-1 (1966) (repealed 1976).
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five dollar fee for every suit entered and tried regardless of the out-
come. Each justice had county-wide jurisdiction."5 The court rea-
soned that to maximize his income a justice had to hear the most cases
possible. The court held that the system furnished an inducement for a
justice to increase his "business" by favoring plaintiffs."s This was
held to violate a state constitutional mandates2 against administering
justice for sale.5s
THE MISSISSIPPI JUSTICE COURT SYSTEM UNDER SCRUTINY
In 1969 the first official study of the Mississippi judiciary was
completed by the Mississippi Judicial Commission. The Commission
found that the fee system resulted in substantial abuses.5" Further, it
concluded that the fee system of compensation for justices of the peace
and constables created a potential for many abuses "even among men
who are conscientious and honest.""5 The study recognized the
dilemma produced by a justice who knows that a law enforcement of-
ficer or creditor can take his business elsewhere. 6 In 1969 the same
conclusions were also reached in a study by the Law Enforcement
Assistance Division of the Office of the Governor."
In 1975 a study commissioned by the Mississippi Judicial Council
concluded that the fee system had commercialized the justice courts.5 8
A survey of 147 citizens who had contact with justice courts revealed
that forty-five per cent held an unfavorable opinion while only twenty
per cent viewed the court favorably. Thirty-five per cent expressed no
opinion."' The public appeared to have a negative perception of the
-appearance of justice" in the operation of justice courts, the study
concluded. The main reason for this perception was the close relation-
ship the system fostered between judges and the users of their courts.
The 1975 study found that the public felt justice court judges were
too dependent on the highway patrol.6 O Likewise, a negative public
perception of the relationship between justice court judges and
"W. VA. CODE § 50-2-4 (1966) (repealed 1976).
"West Virginia ex rel. Shrewsbury v. Poteet, 202 S.E.2d 628, 631 (W. Va. 1974).
"W. VA. CONST. art.3, § 17.
"West Virginia ex rel. Shrewsbury v. Poteet, 202 S.E.2d 628, 632 (W. Va. 1974).
"REPORT OF THE MISSISSIPPI J UDICIAI" COMMISSION TO THE 1970 RE.ULAR SESSION OF




"MISSISSIPPI COURTS COMPREHENSIVE PLAN UNDER THE OMNIBUS CRIME CONTROL AND
SAFF STREETS ACT OF 1968 AS PRESENTED TO THE LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE Divi-
SION OF THE OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR STATE OF MISSISSIPPI 13-72 (Oct. 16, 1969).
582 COURTS STRATEC, 45 (1975).
"94 id. at 7-44.
"Id. at 7-40. In at least one county, it had become customary for judges to buy din-
ner for highway patrolmen who operated radar details on road blocks in their districts.
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sheriffs was also found." The study concluded that justice court
judges view sheriffs as a principal provider of business. 2 In addition,
the relationship between each justice court judge and his constable
was found to undermine public perception of judicial objectivity."
Furthermore, the study concluded that the payment of civil fees
directly to the justice court judge rather than through the county per-
mitted financial abuses.84 One example is the use of criminal process
to collect a civil debt.8 s Testimony gathered during litigation of
Brown indicated that creditors recognize that the justice court judges
need their "business."8 8 Likewise, one Jackson County judge had a
"business" card printed for distribution to creditors. 7
In Brown the court concluded that since justice court judges
follow the applicable law concerning venue and jurisdiction there
could be no "forum shopping."" However, the two studies specifi-
cally found problems with venue being respected by the courts. In the
1975 study, interviews with justice court judges revealed that four-
teen per cent felt that venue was not being observed.68 The study con-
cluded that this resulted in favored judges receiving cases not within
their venue." The 1969 study emphasized that a potential existed for
Testimony of James L. Garner, Jr. and W. R. Patterson, TRANSCRIPT OF STENOGRAPHIC
NOTES TAKEN AT THE PUBuC HEARING OF JUSTICE OF THE PEACE COURTS AND JUD(;ES
BEFORE THE MISSISSIPPI JUDICIARY COMMISSION, New Capitol Building, Jackson,
Mississippi, August 16, 1969, pp. 21, 49-50 (hereinafter cited as STENOGRAPHIC NOTES].
'2 id. at 48.
"4 id. at 7-40.
*12 id. at 47. In certain areas of the state husband and wife teams serve as judge and
constable. 4 id. at 7-42.
642 id. at 45.
"Mississippi ex rel. Richardson v. Edgeworth, 214 So. 2d 579 (Miss. 1968). See also
Testimony of Mayo Grubbs from the STENOGRAPHIC NOTES, supra note 60 at 15.
"See Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 30, Brown v. Vance, No. 78-3225 (5th Cir.
appeal docketed Oct. 11, 1978).
Q. So, Mr. Covington (a Hinds County justice court judge) has been in your of-
fice and stated to you about needing business and sending us business?
A. Yes, sir. Words to that effect.
Q. Let me ask you what have you understood to be what Justice Court Judge
Covington wants?
A. He wants and needs business in order to have income to make a profit. It's
just that simple.
Q. He wants your business?
A. Sure, he wants all the business he can get at the present time.
'Id. at 29. The card read as follows:
We work on bad checks around the clock.
SATISFACTION GUARANTEED
Also on bad accounts.
References furnished on the jobs we perform
"No. 72J-91(N), slip op. at 8 (S.D. Miss. 1978), appeal docketed, No. 78-3225 (5th
Cir. Oct. II, 1978).
"4 COURTS STRATEGY 7-4 (1975).
'Old.
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creditors to use the defendant's ignorance of proper venue for their
benefit.7
The amount of compensation as well as the disparities in the com-
pensation received by justice court judges is indicative of the potential
for competition within the system. In 1975 the median income of a
justice court judge was between $2,000 and $2,500, which is less than
the per capita state average.72 After the number of justices was re-
duced to five in all but two counties,"1 the median income rose to
$3,005 in 1977."' In 1977 the largest gross income was $63,353, the
largest net income was $25,905, while two justices reported zero net
income." Twelve justices reported no criminal fees while forty-seven
reported no civil fees in 1977." The conclusion that competitive
tendencies could be promoted by a system that so distributes compen-
sation can easily be drawn.
ANALYSIS BY THE COURT
In Brown the court recognized that a "fair trial in a fair tribunal"
is a fundamental requirement of due process." The court also estab-
lished that this requirement applied equally to civil and criminal
cases.78 After holding the "possible temptation" doctrine in Tumey"8
applicable, 0 the court discussed its expansion in Wards' and Gibson
v. Berryhill.8 2 However, the court held that the plaintiffs had not met
their burden of proof. It stated:
If the test were whether the plaintiffs were able to produce the
testimony of any person that the fee system presented a source of possi-
ble temptation, the Court might conclude that they should prevail;
however, the test is whether the system presents a 'possible temptation
to the average man as a judge', and this Court finds that the plaintiffs
have not carried their burden under this test, particularly in light of the
presumption of honesty and integrity described in Withrow."
"11970 LEGISLATIVE REPORT, supra note 54, at 59.
"14 COURTS STRATEcFM 7-6 (1975).
"MISS. CODE ANN. § 9-11-1 (Supp. 1975) (current version at Supp. 1978).
"This figure is derived from the 1977 Annual Financial Statements from 405 justice
court judges filed with the Secretary of State.
raid.
Told.
"72J-91(N), slip op. at 29 (S.D. Miss. 1978), appeal docketed, No. 78-3225 (5th Cir.
Oct. II, 1978) (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)).
"Id. Compare Johnson v. Mississippi, 403 U.S. 212, 216 (1971) with Fay v. New
York, 332 U.S. 261, 268 (1946).
'See notes 24-27 and accompanying textual material, supra.
1172J-91(N)h slip op. at 30 (S.D. Miss. 1978), appeal docketed, No. 78-3225 (5th Cir.
Oct. 13. 1978).
"See notes 29-32 and accompanying textual material, supra.
"1411 U.S. 564 (1972).
"No. 72J-91(N), slip op. at 32 (S.D. Miss. 1978), appeal docketed. No. 78-3225 (Sth
Cir. Oct. II. 1978).
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By so stating the court made clear that the Withrow presumption of
honesty and integrity is rebuttable.
Traditionally, federal courts have applied the Withrow presump-
tion in administrative cases in which an unconstitutional risk of bias
was alleged to exist because the adjudicator also acted as the in-
vestigator in the case.8 4 In Brown, however, the alleged risk of bias
was a result of the judge having a pecuniary interest in the outcome of
the case. It appears, therefore, that the court in Brown did not apply
the proper standard to determine the constitutionality of the opera-
tion of the fee system. The plaintiffs did not allege that the combina-
tion of investigative and adjudicative functions created an unconstitu-
tional risk of bias. Rather, their contention was, as in Tumey, that a
judicial officer had a pecuniary interest in the outcome of the case. No
other federal court has used the Withrow presumption to limit that
contention.
In Marathon Oil Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency" the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit specifically noted
this distinction. The court considered whether due process was vio-
lated when a regional administrator reviewed a draft permit which he
originally issued. Upholding the review, the court stated that this
situation "more nearly resembles the permissible combination of in-
vestigation and adjudication sanctioned by Withrow v. Larkin....
than, for example, the situation in which a judge receives as compen-
sation part of a fine which he levies, Tumey v. Ohio ..... ."8 The
words of the Court in Tumey immediately preceding the "possible
temptation" doctrine support this conclusion. The Court held that
"the requirement of due process of law in judicial procedure is not
satisfied by the argument that men of the highest honor and greatest
self-sacrifice could carry it on without danger of injustice. ""
The court's cursory treatment in Brown of trial by jury in justice
courts further indicates its use of the improper standard of constitu-
tionality in deciding the case. 8
In Melikian v. Avent,88 the Federal District Court for the Northern
District of Mississippi held that the right to a jury trial dissipates the
possibility of prejudice of a justice court judge."' In Brown the court,
"See, e.g., Hortonville Joint School Dist. No. I v. Hortonville Educ. Ass'n., 426 U.S.
482,493 (1976); Central Ark. Auction Sale, Inc. v. Bergland. 570 F.2d 724, 730-31 (8th
Cir. 1978); Giles Lowery Stockyards, Inc. v. Department of Agriculture, 565 F.2d 321,
324 n. 2 (5th Cir. 1977); Gross v. United States, 531 F.2d 482, 490 n. 5 (Ct. Cl. 1976);
Klinge v. Lutheran Charities Ass'n. of St. Louis. 523 F.2d 56, 63 (8th Cir. 1975); Euster
v. Pennsylvania State Horse Racing Comm'n., 431 F. Supp. 828. 833 (E.D. Penn. 1977);
Rite Aid Corp. v. Board of Pharmacy, 421 F. Supp. 1161, 1176-77 (D.N.J. 1976);
Stebbins v. Weaver. 396 F. Supp. 104, 114 (W.D. Wis. 1975).
81564 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1977). See also Kelly v. Action for Boston Community
Develop., Inc., 419 F. Supp. 511. 523 (D. Mass. 1976).
"Marathon Oil Co. v.. Environmental Protection Agency, 564 F.2d 1253, 1265 (9th
Cir. 1977).
"Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927).
"No. 72J-91(N), slip op. at 24 (S.D. Miss. 1978), appeal docketed, No. 78-3225 (5th
Cir. Oct. 11, 1978).
"300 F. Supp..516 (N.D. Miss. 1969).
"Id. at 518-19. See also People v. Cheever, 370 Mich. 165, 121 N.W.2d 430 (1963).
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after deciding that juries are selected in a fair and impartial
manner,9' never set forth that conclusion. Perhaps the court noted
that the Supreme Court in Ward criticized this "procedural safe-
guard" reasoning. In Ward the Court held that any unfairness at the
trial level could not be corrected on appeal by a trial de novo.
9 2
In Mississippi's justice courts, either party may demand a trial by
jury composed of six persons. A judge must conform his judgment to
the verdict of the jury." The jury venire is selected by the constable
after being so ordered by his justice court judge.14 A constable may
select any citizen competent to serve on a jury in circuit court."
However, it appears that jury trials are seldom elected. In a
sample of eighty-four justice court judges made in 1975, seventy-four
per cent had conducted no jury trials in criminal cases and sixty-five
per cent had never presided over a civil jury trial.16 Nine per cent of
the judges had conducted between one and three criminal trials while
only seventeen per cent had had over four criminal trials.9 On the
civil side twenty per cent of the judges had held between one and three
jury trials while only fifteen per cent had conducted more than four
civil trials.99 That jury trials are seldom sought perhaps reflects the
level of confidence litigants and defendants have in the court's ad-
ministration of such trials. The infrequent election of jury trials also
appears to place the validity of "procedural safeguard" reasoning in
Melikian into question.
CONCLUSION
Due process requires that "justice must satisfy the appearance of
justice."9 9 The appearance of justice requires a "neutral and detached
judge in the first instance"'9 00 and a "fair trial in a fair tribunal."'"' In
Tumey and Ward the systems of compensation were deemed un-
constitutional without a showing of actual bias by any one judicial of-
ficer. It was sufficient that the systems created a "possible temptation
to the average man as a judge.' 1 2 The court in Brown held that the
.'No. 72J-91(N), slip op. at 25 (S.D. Miss. 1978), appeal docketed, No. 78-3225 (5th
Cir. Oct. 1I, 1978).
11409 U.S. at 61.
"MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-9-143 (1972) (civil trials); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-33-9 (1972)
(criminal trials). See also Shaffer v. Bridges, 295 F. Supp. 869 (S.D. Miss. 1969), appeal
dismissed, 397 U.S. 94 (1970).
"See note 93, supra. See also Miss. CODE ANN. § 19-19-7 (1972).
SMlSS. CODE ANN. § 13-5-1 (1972).
64 COURTS STRATEGY 7-39 (1975).
"Id.
"sId.
"Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954).
'**Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57. 61-62 (1972); See also Callan v.
Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 556 (887).
"'In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).
'"Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927), quoted with approval in Ward v.
Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 60 (1972).
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plaintiffs had not shown that the justice court system operates in a
manner which does not allow judges to make detached and imper-
sonal judgments.'" The court's reliance on the Withrow presumption
of honesty and integrity to limit the Tumey "possible temptation" test
is in error.
In addition, the court's reliance on the right to a jury trial to
uphold the constitutionality of the fee system is ripe for challenge. The
need for a jury trial as a "procedural safeguard" admits the existence
of the potential for unconstitutionality. The United States Supreme
Court has rejected this "procedural safeguard" reasoning.0 '"
The economics of the fee system operates to stimulate the desire for
compensation. Justice court judges are viewed as entrepreneurs and
their courts as "businesses." To earn daily bread and butter the
system forces maximization of the collection of fees.' In Ward the
Court held "plainly that [a] 'possible temptation' may also exist when
the mayor's executive responsibilities for village finances may make
him partisan to maintain the high level of contribution from the
mayor's court."'08 Certainly that temptation is no less possible when a
justice court judge is responsible for his own finances.
G. Dan Stewart
"'No. 72J-91(N), slip op. at 32 (S.D. Miss. 1978). appeal docketed, No. 78-3225 (5th
Cir. Oct. 11, 1978).
'"Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 61-62 (1972).
'"Analysis reveals that the fee system operates as a basic "market system." The
science of economics is premised on the theory that a market system forces men to max-
imize profits. For an introduction, see R. HEILBRONEK, THE EcoNoMic PROBLEM chs. 1-3
(6th ed. 1977).
'"Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 60 (1972).
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